Drawing on recent political theory that asks what the relationship between inclusive deliberation and oppositional activism is in processes of democratization, we develop a case study of environmental justice mobilisation in post-apartheid South Africa. We focus on the emergence of a network of social movement organisations embedded in particular localities in the city of Durban, connected into national and transnational campaigns, and centred on grievances around industrial air pollution. We analyse how the geographies of uneven industrial and urban development in Durban combine with sedimented place-based histories of activism to make particular locations spaces of democratic contention, where the scope and operation of formal democratic procedures are challenged and transformed. We examine the range of strategic engagements adopted by social movement organisations in pursuing their objectives, looking in particular at the dynamic interaction between inclusion in deliberative forums and more adversarial, activist strategies of legal challenge and dramaturgical protest. We identify the key organisational features of organisations involved in this environmental justice network which both enable and constrain particular patterns of democratic engagement with the state and capital. We also identify a disjuncture between the interpretative frames of different actors involved in participatory policy making. Both of these factors help to explain the difficulties faced by social movement organisations in opening up the space for legitimate non-parliamentary opposition in a political culture marked by norms of conciliation and consensus. 
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1). Inclusion, opposition and democratization
During and after the negotiated transition from apartheid to formal democracy in the 1990s, South African politics has been shaped by a strong impulse towards the inclusion of potential antagonists within networks of state patronage and policy-making (Robinson 1998) . In this paper we use a case study of the politics of environmental justice in the South African city of Durban to explore the degree to which inclusion is the only criteria by which to assess the process of democratization (Dryzek 1996 , Young 2000 . 1 We examine the dynamic between inclusion in deliberative policy forums and governance structures on the one hand, and adversarial activism on other, arguing that this dynamic shapes the forms of democratic opposition that emerge in diverse public spheres.
Understanding the relationships between activism and deliberation has become a key theme of recent democratic theory (Young 2001) . Of particular relevance to the discussion here is literature raising the question of whether theories of agonistic democracy can provide the relevant criteria for the analysis of democratization in divided, highly unequal societies (e.g. Dryzek 2002 , Kapoor 2002 , Slater 2002 ).
Since the late 1990s there has been a sharp increase in environmental activism in South Africa, shaped by discourses of environmental justice and often focussed on contested programmes of industrial development (see Bond 2002) . This coincides with a broader resurgence of social movement politics including activism around land rights, HIV/AIDS activism, and basic service delivery (Ballard 2005) . The emergence of an environmental justice movement in the post-apartheid period has connected a long-standing conservation movement, traditionally the preserve of privileged white communities, with the concerns about everyday spaces of social reproduction that characterise poor communities suffering from a long history of systematic environmental racism (Barnett 2003 , Cock 2004 ).
The significance of the locally embedded, but nationally and transnationally networked environmental justice movement we discuss here needs to be located in the wider context of debates about the unfolding logic of oppositional politics in South African democracy.
Given the ANC's overwhelming electoral dominance, Butler (2003) argues that analytic attention should shift to the role of non-electoral mechanisms in holding government to account and checking the abuse of centralised power. Accordingly, the significance of the networked environmental politics that has emerged in Durban and beyond for the institutionalisation of democratic opposition in South Africa can be assessed along two axes (cf. Stephan 1997, 657) : in terms of its effectiveness in projecting new issues of contention into the public sphere; and in terms of its effectiveness in generating new mechanisms of democratic accountability. Environmental policy-making in South Africa has seen the growth of what Dryzek (1994, 188) Section 2 discusses the spatialities that come together to South Durban a distinctive site of contentious politics. Section 3 analyses the dynamic of inclusion and activism shaping the strategic engagements by environmental justice organisations with state and corporate actors. Section 4 focuses on the disjuncture between the interpretative frames of activists, business representatives, politicians, and the state that helps to shape this dynamic.
2). Sites of democratic contention
Macro-economic policy in post-apartheid South Africa has, since 1996, been determined by a framework known as GEAR (Growth, Employment and Redistribution). GEAR imposes 'neoliberal' fiscal austerity from a national level downwards, at the same time as national government remains committed to the roll-out of basic needs to citizens. This latter imperative is devolved downwards to the local state, restructured according to principles of 'developmental local government' (Parnell et al 2002) , whereby municipal authorities attempt to combine pro-growth and pro-poor economic strategies. The contradiction between the costs of service delivery and nationally imposed constrictions on revenue has generated an array of highly localised political mobilisations (Hart 2003) .
This scalar relationship between national fiscal policy and local state capacity is overlain by the inherited uneven geography of capital accumulation in South African cities. The nationally-derived imperative to promote economic growth is focussed on specific 'spaces of dependence' where fixed investments of plant, machinery, and skilled labour have been built up over time (cf. Cox 1998) . This leads some localities being identified as key sites of nationally significant strategic economic growth. It is one such place that we focus on here, the so-called Southern Industrial Basin (SIB) in Durban. The spatialization of the accumulation processes comes together here in distinctive ways: South Durban is both a key cluster of industrial activity, particularly in petro-chemicals, as well as a key transport hub for the circulation of capital, given its adjacency to the port of Durban. In
South Durban, the dynamic interaction of state imperatives of accumulation, delivery, and legitimation (cf. Dryzek et al 2003) is geographically articulated in such as way as to make this a site of democratic contention (Figure 1 ).
In the post-apartheid period, the SIB has been consistently identified by the local state and the national government as a strategic location for further economic growth. The 'envisioning' of South Durban revolves around the role of the SIB in a wider city-wide framework of economic development, shaped in turn by national economic imperatives as well as by particular policy understandings of 'globalisation' and urban economies (Robinson 2006) . The strategic vision of South Durban's future centres on enhancing investment in high value added manufacturing sectors such as chemicals, plastics, metalworking and motor industry, thereby building on the potential for clustering in and around the SIB and the transport hub around the port.
The re-envisioning of Durban's economic futures has taken place at the same time as new frameworks for environmental governance has been put in place. The formal legislative framework for environmental governance in South Africa is laid down in 1998's National Environmental Management Act (NEMA), the product of sustained participatory and consultative policy-making including stakeholders from civil society (Oelefse et al 2005) . NEMA provides the formal framework for the selective inclusion of social movement actors in environmental decision-making around specified local issues.
This system post-apartheid environmental governance is a version of "dependent ecological modernization" (Sonnenfeld 2002, 23) , in which a strong impulse to further develop 'dirty' industries rubs up against externally sourced global norms of environmental governance procedures which open up narrow channels for public participation. In such contexts, it is likely that the role of civil society and social movement actors will be more contentious than envisaged in advanced capitalist liberal democracies of the North: they are likely to combine the role of "inside players" with that of "outside influences" (ibid., 21).
South Durban first emerged as a publicly identified 'environmental hotspot' in the mid1990s, during a period of intense administrative restructuring of the local state. The newly unified local government commissioned a 'State of the Environment' report for the whole city in 1996, and then in turn a Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) of the South Durban basin in 1999 (Freund 2001) . The SEA argued that resources required for dealing with the areas chronic pollution problems would be generated by attracting further investment in industrial development. The SEA process established the terms around which the contentious politics of South Durban's future have been organised ever since. Growth-led development visions for the future of the SIB run up against the longstanding grievances of local communities over the quality of living environments in the area. Industrial pollution has been a pressing concern for the predominantly poor back local communities in South Durban for decades. These communities have their origins in the forced relocation of the 1950s and 1960s under the Group Areas Act, when they were moved into an area already ear-marked for further industrial development (Scott 2003) .
The residential areas of South Durban suffer from high levels of air, ground, and water pollution, not least because of their proximity to two oil refineries, a paper and pulp factory, and myriad petro-chemical plants. This proximity to sites of national strategic economic importance has, however, provided the opportunity for SMOs to generate highly visible and contentious expressions of the tensions between 'dirty growth' on the one hand, and social justice and delivery imperatives on the other. Mobilisation around environmental pollution and the industrial futures of the SIB has been the spark for the development of a broader environmental justice movement around 'dirty growth' that has linked other pollution 'hotspots' around South Africa into a transnational network of advocacy, research, activism, and lobbying.
The capacity of SMOs in South Durban to take advantage of this opportunity is, however, also a function of distinctive histories of activism in these communities, as well as on the capacity to build spatially extensive networks of engagement. Variations in levels of community mobilisation are shaped by the relationship between sedimented, place-specific capacities for community mobilisation and activist leadership on the one hand (Nelson 2003) , and the development of new frameworks of state coordinated consultation and participation on the other (Stokke et al 2003) . In South Durban, new forms of mobilisation have emerged in the last decade around the health impacts of poorly regulated industrial development. In particular, these have focussed on the health impacts of air and ground pollution. This upsurge of mobilisation is related to the long history of civic organisation and political activism in this area (Chari 2004 other pollution 'hotspots' around South Africa (Tarrow 2001, 15) .
In the next section we track the emergence of this spatially extensive but issue-specific environmental justice network as it passes through South Durban. We focus in particular on the ways in which pressures on SMOs towards inclusion -to compromise and deliberate -are offset by countervailing pressures to mobilise opposition outside of formal arenas of policy and governance.
3). Dynamic democratization and environmental justice
Air pollution in particular has become emblematic of a broader problem of industrial pollution and environmental injustice in South Durban, articulated in terms of a history of lack of recognition and systematic secrecy. Mobilisation around these issues has in turn centred on demands for both substantive and procedural justice: that there should be no more unplanned development, that future development should adhere to the highest standards of environmental quality, and that businesses are held accountable for their past actions; and that those affected by past and future industrial development should be part of the decision-making process. These principles are clearly set out in SDCEA's vision statement published to mark it's 10 th anniversary (SDCEA, 2006) .
These two sets of demands are not easily squared; the inclusion of activists and SMOs in formal deliberative procedures has in part served to underscore a relative lack of progress on more substantive demands, and this in turn helps to account for the range of more oppositional strategies that they have continued to deploy. The tension between them helps account for the juggling by SMOS of more inclusive, deliberative strategies with more adversarial forms of activism.
3.i). Participation in deliberative forums
The most important of the new procedures established by NEMA to facilitate and promote public participation in environmental governance is a re-vamped Environmental Impact Assessment system. The EIA system requires that the provincial government sees to it that businesses seek representations and opinions from affected communities. It is a means through which a three-way engagement between state, capital, and civil society actors has been institutionalized. In KwaZulu-Natal, the overwhelming majority of EIAs handled by the provincial environmental management department pertain to proposed industrial development in South Durban. One of the successes of environmental justice mobilization since the 1990s has been to establish SDCEA as the 'certified'
representative of local communities in this EIA process (Scott et al, 2002) . This strategy is still driven by the logic of inclusion in environmental governance, and it has required a set of organizational transformations in SDCEA, with an increasing emphasis on external fundraising, professional administration, and formal advocacy. The flip-side of this inclusion is that SDCEA has become a 'dumping ground' for EIA's. Faced with an increasing volume of EIA applications, SDCEA has found itself faced with the problem of 'stakeholder burnout' as it struggles to cope with the technical and scientific demands required to make participation in these procedures meaningful. In terms of substantive outcomes, this engagement reaps few tangible benefits. Virtually every EIAs is approved. In effect, the EIA process supports incremental industrial expansion, and SDCEA's inclusion in deliberative procedures therefore does little address their more fundamental demands for more meaningful participation by local communities in the long-term planning of the SIB.
In principle, the EIA process provides for the inclusion of the interests of marginalized groups into the decision-making process (cf. Scott and Oelofse 2005 Here there is a clear sense that the purpose of 'activism' is to exert pressure on both the state and capital in order to shift the parameters of inclusive forums and deliberative procedures. Doing 'activism' therefore has an instrumental function, internally connected to more conciliatory practices of engagement in deliberative forums. But it also has an intrinsic dimension as a means through which representative, networked organisations like SDCEA and Groundwork maintain their own coherence and perform their legitimacy to their constituent memberships and broader publics. We now explore each of these dimensions of doing activism, and elaborate on the dynamic relationship between them.
3.ii). Activism and enforcement
Environmental justice SMOs from South Durban have adopted less conciliatory approaches in order to enforce formal commitments and procedures. These include legal challenges to the local and provincial government, aimed at forcing the state to engage more proactively with capital over pollution issues. SDCEA's to pursue this course has depended on establishing links with the Cape Town based Legal Resources Centre (LRC), an NGO which provides legal services to poor and historically vulnerable people, and which has a long running involvement in environmental justice issues. This tension between contention and consensus is internalized in the strains that shape SDCEA's activities its relationship with partners in this network of environmental justice mobilisation. It has become a more formalized NGO, with professional staff and external donor relationships oriented to increasing the organizations' capacity to engage in what are often highly technical scientific consultation procedures. At the same time, SDCEA is an alliance of groups which are often highly localized with the South Durban area. As it has been drawn into deliberative procedures that have required the formalization and organizational transformation of SDCEA, so the strains in this mediated relationship with local communities have become more and more difficult to negotiate. And herein lays one reason why SDCEA is unable to straightforwardly adopt the deliberative strategy considered the norm by international advocacy groups such as DN: the dramaturgy of adversarial activism is one of the repertoires available to SDCEA to perform its legitimacy to local communities. As Chari (2004, 25) observes, SDCEA "does not command a steady mass base", but "they can pull in a crowd for spectacular events by drawing on a variety of other community organisations".
3.iii). Activism and legitimacy
SDCEA has achieved success in becoming the 'certified' voice of environmental expertise amongst local communities in the SIB and more broadly in Durban. But as it has been drawn into inclusive, deliberative forms of engagement, and become more formalized as an organization, it has also maintained an array of informal protest and "'Healthy' organizations make good partners. The healthier an organization is, the more it is able to mobilize constituency and garner support. In addition, a series of strong local NGOs that work collaboratively with SAPREF on development issues is probably the best 'shield' against negative press, and certainly an enhancement to reputational issues. To that effect, SAPREF should dedicate a proportion of its Social Investment funds to build the organisational capacity of community-based NGOs in Wentworth and Merebank." (Ibid., 37).
This is a business-friendly model of participatory development, translated from a Dutch context to South Africa, in which 'corporate social investment' is to be used to build relationships business interests with local service delivery priorities. It is a vision explicitly aimed at engendering a more conciliatory, cooperative and less confrontational engagement between capital and local communities, preferably unmediated by state regulation or legislation.
There is a fundamental incommensurability tension between the 'inclusive' impulse of corporate social programmes aimed at building strategically beneficial partnerships, and the demands of SMOs for accountability and redress of past injustice. The discourse of environmental racism adopted by South African activists focuses not just compensation for current pollution, but also makes demands for historical accountability and redress.
This division over the degree to which past injustice has been adequately put right or whether a line should be drawn under the abuses of apartheid is fundamental to the different interpretations of how organisations like SDCEA and Groundwork should engage in the politics of environmental governance. This network of environmental justice organisations is embedded in localities in which persistent exposure to environmental risks is entangled with lived histories of the injustices and legacies of apartheid. SAPREF's adoption of Shell's Social Performance agenda, in so far as it is couched in a vocabulary of corporate social investment rather than responsibility, is implicated in a wider attempt to avoid calls for redress for the inequalities inherited from apartheid of which they were a beneficiary (Fig 2005) . Some activists hold that SDCEA's public mandate must be based in a constant, iterative process of calling and holding meetings in which mandates are given and confirmed. In this vision, an organisations' public mandate is garnered and maintained through high levels of community participation; SMOs are understood as delegates of communities.
But SDCEA's mandate is not derived directly from participation of a membership base; it is mediated by the member organisations of which it is made up:
"We get our mandate from public forums, you know we have regular meetings in the public domain, we have mandates from the schools, churches and all the other In principle at least, it is these organisations that derive their mandates from highly mobilised active community participation, as one former SDCEA activist explains:
"Now the way reps are supposed to function is that they come from another organisation and they have like a whole lot of like strings of attachments in terms of in their community, and they are meant to follow certain procedures to ensure that there is a sense of democracy in the community, that the decisions that they take are based on the fact that they've gone out and found out what people need".
(Michelle Simons, Interview, Durban, 12 th February 2004).
The practicability of this model has been strained by transformations in the nature of local activism in communities in South Durban since 1994. Former SDCEA activists recognise that the increasing dependence of SDCEA on donor funding is an inevitable response to the need to engage in technocratic and scientific modes of public participation, they also see this as a reason for the lack of attention to grassroots mobilisation in local communities. In contrast, an active member of SDCEA's executive committee acknowledges the difficulty that SDCEA has in maintaining its legitimacy with local communities, but puts this down to heightened apathy:
"You are having your elections, you are running democratically, people I think are happy, but they don't come in and they don't contribute and that kind of thing.
They are quite comfortable with you taking their issue and running with it. We don't have the direct grassroots accountability, we do what we think is right and we carry on" (Rajen Naidoo, Interview, Durban, 7 th August 2004.
While these two perspectives differ over the reasons for the relative lack of active mobilisation around environmental concerns, and over the degree to which community mobilisation should be the responsibility of an organisation like SDCEA, both acknowledge that the absence of sustained popular mobilisation around these issues is a persistent problem for SMOs.
SDCEA has had to negotiate changing dynamics of community participation, including transformation in the way in which previously highly active local ANC branches are organised, in its core support areas of Merebank and Wentworth, at the same time as it tries to reach out and sustain support in other communities characterised by distinctive socio-economic and political histories of their own. SDCEA is already a network of organisations, and its consolidation has in turn involved it being drawn into wider networks at national and international level. In part, recourse to activist repertoires is an expression of the distance between SDCEA and its local constituencies, a distance exacerbated by the organisational transformation that it has undergone as it has been included into expertise-heavy forums of public consultation and participatory. 
4). Activism and the norms of deliberation
The ongoing recourse to adversarial and confrontational styles of oppositional activism is, therefore, an effect of various factors. It reflects the fundamental limitations of participatory procedures when it comes to addressing substantive demands for a moratorium on industrial development, since this demand runs directly against the economic imperative to promote further expansion in the SIB. But it also reflects the distinctive organisational structure of environmental activism that has grown up around the contested futures of South Durban: SDCEA has a highly mediated relationship with its key constituents, which means that it is obliged to make use of protest repertoires that run against the conciliatory logic embedded in formal procedures adopted by both state and capital; it is also part of a spatially extensive network of transnational advocacy whose activities often centre on set-piece events of spectacular protest aimed at generating maximum public attention in various media. These styles of activism are part of the same dynamic through which SDCEA and Groundwork have successfully engaged in more inclusive and deliberative forums. But they sit uncomfortably alongside one another.
The complex relationship between local, national and transnational SMOs in this network is at the heart of the systematic conflict of interpretations between social In turn, the recourse to adversarial activist strategies makes the efforts of SMOs to be included in more deliberative participatory forums that much more difficult: In short, the values being enacted in the contestation by SMOs of the parameters of the formal deliberative forums of environmental governance are ones in which oppositional activism is considered not only legitimate, but an essential aspect of the effective realisation of the participatory and representative objectives of those forums. Contentious activist strategies appear to be at the opposite end of the spectrum to the highly formal styles of participation represented by inclusion of civil society representatives in EIA procedures. But the relationship between them is an internal, dynamic one, shaped by the multiple and competing imperatives that a network of environmental activism such as this has to respond to. The limits of inclusive forums, which generate an impulse towards organisational specialisation, generate an ongoing imperative to maintain an activist stance aimed at shifting the parameters under which those inclusive forums are organised. It is in the relationship between these deliberative and activist strategies that one can identify the emergence of an effective space of democratic opposition. We can now returning to the two criteria for assessing the contribution of civil society actors in institutionalising opposition as a legitimate aspect of democratic politics that we identified in Section 1. Firstly, the primary achievement of the environmental justice network we have discussed here is to have established pollution as a significant issue to be taken account of in calculations of development pathways.
And secondly, they have succeeded in establishing new structures of accountability, such as the MPP, in which the legitimacy of community organizations as having a voice in the public realm is recognized. Furthermore, this example has many of the characteristics identified by Dryzek (2005) as criteria of the democratizing potential of effective social movement mobilization in divided societies, in which the balance between consensual deliberation and agonistic activist is always under negotiation: it involves ongoing engagement with a variety of public spheres; it is issue-specific; it is loosely connected to state apparatuses; and it is situated transnationally.
The case of environmental justice politics in and beyond South Durban therefore illustrates that SMOs are able to pursue 'dualistic' strategies combining the strategic rationality of inclusion aimed at gaining reforms from the state (and capital), as well as the discursive politics aimed at changing identities and affiliations in civil and political society (Dryzek 1996, 484) . Inclusion in formal procedures of consultation and participation conceal the ways in which structural inequalities skew deliberative practices in favour of powerful actors (Young 2001, 671) . This is one reason why SMOs continue to have recourse to more contentious forms of mobilisation outside of deliberative forums. On the other hand, it is unwise to assume that the impact of movements only comes from remaining outside the state and economy and applying external pressure. We have seen that a key dimension of social movement activity in this case is focussed on 'making government work', and this is indicate of an implicit acknowledgement amongst participants in this movement that, as Young (1999, 151) democratically legitimated states "potentially and sometimes actually exhibit uniquely important virtues to support social justice in ways no other social processes do".
The strategies adopted by environmental justice organisations in Durban in the last decade can, then, only be understood in light of the genuine democratization of procedural practices in environmental governance since 1994. These organisations combine inclusive and deliberative strategies: "We do both, one is that we do activism and we also negotiate". ( 
